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Introduction
The creation of a user-friendly, accessible graphical web fundamentally changed information
seeking behaviors, in many ways for the better.2 More people had faster access to information, in
a more convenient manner, and in forms that could be consumed anywhere (so long as the user
has a device and a data connection). Research was no longer confined entirely to specific
physical repositories of information. While the digital divide meant that some have not yet seen
the full benefits of this movement, it is undeniable that more people each year have greater
access to information.3
However, there are downsides to such unfettered and convenient access as well. It has
been well documented that ease of access triumphs over quality information in user choice, with
users settling for a “good enough” convenient, unverified, online source over consulting a less
convenient source that they know is more likely to be reputable.4 Various other studies have
shown that people have difficulty evaluating the validity of content online,5 and even when
aware of their own inability to judge, will still rely on information that they can retrieve easily,
even when accuracy is questionable.6 As applies to online information, this means that a fair
number of people are willing to rely on sources like social media7 or falsified information8 that
are readily available online without any attempt to check the information if there is no equally
easy way to perform such a check.
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See, Xi Niu et al., National Study of Information Seeking Behavior of Academic Researchers in the United States,
61 J. AMER. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 869 (2010); Feifei Liu, How Information-Seeking Behavior Has Changed in
22 Years, https://www.nngroup.com/articles/information-seeking-behavior-changes/.
3
See, Emily A. Vogels, Digital Divide Persists Even as Americans with Lower Incomes Make Gains in Tech
Adoption, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/22/digital-divide-persistseven-as-americans-with-lower-incomes-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/.
4
See, Michael Barthel et al., Measuring News Consumption in a Digital Era, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.journalism.org/2020/12/08/measuring-news-consumption-in-a-digital-era/ (noting that most Americans
do not pay for news and social media is generally used as regularly for news as official newspapers/sites); Lynn
Silipigni Connaway, Timothy J. Dickey & Marie L. Radford, “If It Is Too Inconvenient, I’m Not Going After It:”
Convenience as a Critical Factor in Information-seeking Behaviors, 33 LIB. & INFO. SCI. RES. 179 (2011).
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Sam Wineburg et al., Evaluating Information: The Cornerstone of Civic Online Reasoning, STANFORD DIGITAL
REPOSITORY (2016). Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/fv751yt5934
6
Supra note 4.
7
See, Elisa Shearer & Elizabeth Grieco, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social Media Sites Play in Delivering the
News, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/8/2019/09/PJ_2019.09.25_Social-Media-and-News_FINAL.pdf.
8
See, Max Read, How Much of the Internet Is Fake? Turns Out, a Lot of It, Actually, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/how-much-of-the-internet-is-fake.html (detailing the proliferation of fake
users, businesses, news, commentary, traffic on the web); Amy Mitchell et al., Americans Who Mainly Get Their
News on Social Media Are Less Engaged, Less Knowledgeable, PEW RES. CTR. (July 30, 2020),
https://www.journalism.org/2020/07/30/americans-who-mainly-get-their-news-on-social-media-are-less-engagedless-knowledgeable/.

While some of this behavior could be due to a genuine disinterest in the truth or
predisposition for only information that matches a person’s own worldview,9 part of it can also
be explained by the fact that unverified information overwhelms the amount of reliable data that
is found on the open web. Because of the unfiltered nature of the web, opinions, random
comments, falsified facts, and fake news can be posted faster and in greater number than
reviewed, fact-checked, edited documents, the latter categories taking time, money, and human
manpower to create.10 Bots play an enormous role in this type of rapid-fire misinformation
proliferation,11 but a less discussed contributor is the relative scarcity of reliable information.
After all, bots could be set to spread accurate information as well as inaccurate information, if
accurate information is available to be spread (and if society thinks that bots can be used in this
way ethically).
The scarcity of verifiable information is attributable in part to the fact that many reliable
documents are still only found in print or microform in libraries across the nation or available
only on pay-walled databases. Until there is a mechanism through which these reputable
materials are made easily findable and accessible by the general public, even those who are
minimally interested in checking facts will be discouraged from doing so. The effort in hunting
down information is significant, and it becomes easier to simply accept that what one has read
online is roughly accurate.12
This article suggests that private legislation could make library collections available in a
manner likely to decrease the difficulty in accessing reliable information. Specifically, it suggests
(1) private legislation to overcome the contractual barriers established by Google to prevent their
Partner Libraries from making full use of the digital images they received as part of the Google
Books project, and (2) libraries making these materials available to the nation through means that
expand meaningful access substantially while respecting copyright.
This construct would not overcome the digital divide nor move those that are
disinterested in the truth, but it could make a significant difference for those willing to put in a
minimum amount of effort to verify a data point before publicizing or challenging it. The
Internet Archive has already demonstrated the power of digitization in fact verification through
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Anna Lucia Schmidt et al., Anatomy of News Consumption on Facebook, 114 PNAS 3035 (2017),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/12/3035.full.pdf.
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See, Srijan Kumar & Neil Shah, False Information on Web and Social Media: A Survey (2018),
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~srijan/pubs/paper-survey.pdf.
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See, Edmund L. Andrews, How Fake News Spreads Like a Real Virus, STAN. ENGINEERING MAG. (Oct. 9 2019),
https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/how-fake-news-spreads-real-virus; Christina Nemr & William
Gangware, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital Age (March
2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Weapons-of-Mass-Distraction-Foreign-State-SponsoredDisinformation-in-the-Digital-Age.pdf.
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See, Elisa Shearer & Amy Mitchell, News Use Across Social Media Platforms in 2020, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 2021),
https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2021/01/PJ_2021.01.12_News-and-SocialMedia_FINAL.pdf (noting the heavy reliance on news sources even when readers know that they might be
inaccurate).

their partnership with Wikipedia to turn all the links in the latter’s articles blue, clickable and
leading to an officially published source.13
It is important to note at the outset that at least two developments could make the
necessity of the initial step – private legislation – moot. The first is the digitization effort by the
Internet Archive, which has been digitizing and lending public domain and copyrighted
materials, the latter under controlled digital lending (CDL), for over a decade. Its collection
comprises over 22M works, and since the pandemic, it has been developing a wider reach
through resource-heavy partners like the New Zealand National Library14 which should increase
its digital offerings considerably in the coming years. If its collection eventually includes the
titles targeted by this article, then the first part of the proposal would be unnecessary to reach its
purpose.
The second potential development involves HathiTrust, where the large academic
libraries that partnered with Google on the initial Google Books project have aggregated their
digital objects. The database now contains many more items than just those digitized by Google,
but the Google-corpus still makes up a substantial part of the collection. HathiTrust generally has
provided limited access to copyrighted works, primarily only to members, and the full-text only
to the contributing members or to community members with certified print disabilities.15 With
the pandemic, though, they opened access to full-text much more broadly under a service they
called an Emergency Temporary Access Service (ETAS),16 through which any member library
could access full-texts of works that their libraries owned in print. This service is intended to be
temporary, and applies only to “member libraries that have experienced unexpected or
involuntary, temporary disruption to normal operations, requiring it to be closed to the public, or
otherwise restrict collection access services.”17 If ETAS ends with the pandemic, as it currently
appears slated to do, then it has no effect on this paper. If, however, HathiTrust decides to
continue to provide full-text access and to allow more than members to gain access, the purpose
of this paper may have been accomplished even without the proposed legislation.
Google Agreements with Library Partners
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Klint Finley, The Internet Archive Is Making Wikipedia More Reliable, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/internet-archive-wikipedia-more-reliable/.
14
National Library Signs Historic Agreement With Internet Archive, SCOOP INDEPENDENT NEWS (July 13, 2021),
https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/CU2107/S00072/national-library-signs-historic-agreement-with-internetarchive.htm.
15
“Access to materials in the repository is determined by 1) copyright law and 2) permissions granted by individual
rights holders. Works that HathiTrust partners do not have rights to make available are not made available, or are
made available under very limited circumstances (such as to certified users with disabilities who need to make use
of a screen reader in order to access materials). The primary function of HathiTrust is long-term preservation, with
access to materials secondary, and we make every effort to respect the rights of copyright holders and comply with
copyright law.” https://www.hathitrust.org/help_general.
16
HathiTrust Response to Covid-19, https://www.hathitrust.org/covid-19-response (last visited July 12, 2021).
17
https://www.hathitrust.org/ETAS-Description (last visited July 12, 2021).

In 2004, Google announced that it had partnered with Harvard, Stanford, the University of
Michigan, Oxford University, and the New York Public Library to digitize part or all of their
collections for inclusion in what was then called Google Print.18 As the project continued,
additional libraries were added as partners.19 The announced intention was to create a large,
publicly searchable library, and the result is what the world knows today as Google Books – a
database that allows users to search books, see snippets of the pages relevant to the search, and
(in some cases) buy or license the books shown.
The digitization agreements with the participating libraries to produce this database at the
outset contained terms not just related to the digitization of the libraries’ books but also rules for
the use of the subsequent digital images. Google promised to deliver to participating libraries ecopies of the works digitized from their respective collections but simultaneously limited what
the libraries were permitted to do with them. Examples of the language can be found in the
agreements with the University of Michigan (UM), which it has made publicly available.20 Since
not every agreement is public, the assumption in this paper is that most agreements are similar to
one of the two agreements between Google and UM. And while UM’s second agreement
modified the first, it is impossible to know if every library that entered into an initial agreement
executed a similar amendment, so the terms of each agreement will be analyzed to pinpoint the
problematic clauses.
Original Agreement
Copies Provided and Kept by UM
2.5 U of M Digital Copy. Google agrees to provide to U of M a
copy of all Digitized Selected Content that has been “successfully
processed” within thirty (30) days after the Selected Content is
Digitized, or in a timeframe mutually agreed up by the Parties…
2.5.2 Within 3 years of the time that Google has transferred
Digitized Selected Content to U of M, if Google decides not to use
that content due to a dispute with a third-party, U of M will destroy
that content (so long as it is in print and protected by copyright)
from the U of M Digital Copy…
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David A. Vise, Google to Digitize Some Library Collections: Harvard, Stanford, New York Public Library Among
Project Participants, WASH. POST (December 14, 2005). The number of library partners increased over the course of
the project and the full listing can be found here: https://books.google.com/intl/en_au/googlebooks/partners.html.
19
https://books.google.com/intl/en_au/googlebooks/partners.html (last visited July 7, 2021).
20
The original agreement is at https://staff.lib.umich.edu/sites/staff.lib.umich.edu/files/2020-06/um-googlecooperative-agreement.pdf and the amended version at
https://staff.lib.umich.edu/sites/staff.lib.umich.edu/files/2020-06/Amendment-to-Cooperative-Agreement.pdf.

These two provisions set forth Google’s obligations to provide copies of digital content to UM as
well as UM’s obligation to delete such images under certain conditions. The first provision (2.5)
is not problematic, but the second one (2.5.2) is. While Google’s desire to limit liability by
destroying any copies of works that might be disputed is understandable, this clause arguably
removes a resource from UM’s hands that it has a strong argument to retain. If there is a liability
claim, it is most likely to rest on an allegation of copyright infringement, and since neither party
owns the copyrights, each party should be independently responsible for any use of the images
that infringe on a copyright owner’s rights. UM’s liability if it keeps and uses such a work would
rest only on it, and Google’s involvement in UM’s use should be viewed only through the lens of
a service provider. While the term may be reasonable for disputes outside of copyright (e.g.,
allegations of theft), Google should have retained no other rights to dictate UM’s destruction of
the copies.
In illustration, consider if UM had instead contracted with a third party to digitize a work.
Even if the original document had turned out to be a pirated copy, the third party would not in
the normal course of events be liable for copyright infringement.21 Instead, the requesting party
(and ultimate owner/user of the infringing copy) would have been the party responsible for
answering any claims on infringement. In such an instance, depriving UM of the copy as well as
the opportunity to defend its use, if it had a colorable argument for legitimate use (e.g., orphan
work for which a reasonable search had been conducted and failed), seems counter to innovation
or the ability to establish a fair use.
In this particular agreement, Google could have appropriately limited its liability in case of a
conflict simply by deleting its own copy, allowing UM to do with its copy what it wished while
also assuming 100% of the responsibility for any claims of infringement arising from its use.
Practically speaking, except where any of the contracting libraries has a continuing
relationship with Google to digitize their collections beyond 2018, this clause is likely moot, as
the three-year period after conveyance of the digital copies would have expired.
Original Agreement - Ownership of Digital Copies
4.4 Ownership and Use of U of M Digital Copy. Neither U of M or
Google shall have any ownership or license rights to the Available
Content that is Digitized (i.e., to the materials underlying the
digitization process), except where UM already has such rights. As
between Google and U of M and subject to the provisions of this
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While it is possible that a third party might be contributorily negligent if it knows that its actions are infringing, if
this knowledge is lacking, its ignorance and the lack of involvement in subsequent use of the work should free it
from any consequences. Digitization by itself has typically not been found to be infringing (e.g., not been
controversial in the cases before courts; see Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) and
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) as examples. It is typically only use after reproduction
that triggers legal action and court scrutiny.

section 4, U of M shall own all rights, title, and interest to the U of
M Digital Copy.
This provision is relevant only insofar as it clearly states that UM owns all rights, title and
interest to the UM digital copy, while other provisions in the same agreement explicitly
contradict the ownership principle. Ownership comes through the alienation of rights,22 where
the previous owner surrenders the object and any rights of control to a new owner. Ownership
typically comes with the undivided right to do what the new owner wishes with the owned item
without any interference from previous owners. 2.5.2, discussed above, is one such example of
how that right is compromised, giving Google the rights to dictate what happens to the digital
copy in specific situations. The effect of other clauses will be discussed in later sections.
Original Agreement - Use of UM’s Digital Copies
4.4.1 Use of U of M Digital Copy on U of M Website. U of M
shall have the right to use the U of M Digital Copy, in whole or in
part at U of M's sole discretion, as part of services offered on U of
M's website. U of M shall implement technological measures (e.g.,
through use of the robots.txt protocol) to restrict automated
access to any portion of the U of M Digital Copy or the portions of
the U of M website on which any portion of the U of M Digital
Copy is available. U of M shall also make reasonable efforts
(including but not limited to restrictions placed in Terms of Use for
the U of M website) to prevent third parties from (a)
downloading or otherwise obtaining any portion of the U of M
Digital Copy for commercial purposes, (b) redistributing any
portions of the U of M Digital Copy, or (c) automated and
systematic downloading from its website image files from the U of
M Digital Copy. U of M shall restrict access to the U of M
Digital Copy to those persons having a need to access such
materials and shall also cooperate in good faith with Google to
mutually develop methods and systems for ensuring that the
substantial portions of the U of M Digital Copy are not
downloaded from the services offered on U of M's website or
otherwise disseminated to the public at large. (emphasis added)
“Under the common law, restraints on the alienation of property were disfavored, and the owner of property could
generally dispose of property as the owner desired. Accordingly, under the modern practice, restraints on alienation
of property are disfavored as contrary to public policy. The rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation is
founded entirely upon considerations of public policy, specifically, the idea that the free alienability of property
fosters economic and commercial development.” 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities, Etc. § 88
22

The highlighted text in this provision regarding online access also runs counter to the statement
that UM owns their digital copies. Each of the restrictions in 4.4.1 --- prohibiting automated
access, limiting use by third parties, and limiting access by the public --- ensure that Google
remains a rights holder to the UM images, regardless of where they are stored and despite
contract terms setting UM as the “owner” of these objects.
The provisions limiting third-party use and public access are particularly troubling, as
they make no exception for images of public domain works, fair uses, and make it impossible for
the library to use the digital copy of the work in the same manner as it would have used the
original. Tying a library’s hands to use its own resources for education, research, scholarship,
and teaching serves only the purpose of protecting Google’s monopolization on the use of those
works.
Cooperative Web Services
4.4.2 Use of U of M Digital Copy in Cooperative Web Services.
Subject to the restrictions set forth in this section, U of M shall
have the right to use the U of M Digital Copy, in whole or in part
at U of M‘s sole discretion, as part of services offered in
cooperation with partner research libraries such as the institutions
in the Digital Library Federation. Before making any such
distribution, U of M shall enter into a written agreement with the
partner research library and shall provide a copy of such agreement
to Google, which agreement shall: (a) contain limitations on the
partner research library’s use of the materials that correspond
to and are at least as restrictive as the limitations placed on U
of M's use of the U of M Digital Copy in section 4.4.1; and (b)
shall expressly name Google as a third party beneficiary of that
agreement, including the ability for Google to enforce the
restrictions against the partner research library. (emphasis
added)
Again running counter to ownership rights, UM’s ability to share any digital copy even with
existing partners is subject to Google’s terms, and in some cases, to Google’s consent. Credit to
Google for not prohibiting this type of sharing outright, but the written limitations – (1) requiring
any partners to agree in writing to comply with the original terms of use between Google and
UM and (2) essentially giving Google the right to sue if that agreement is breached – are
substantial barriers to fair use.
Amended Agreement

The amended agreement between UM and Google has many improvements, but the issues
identified above still exist. The relevant provisions are below with brief commentary. The
descriptive terms of “Non-Settlement” and “Settlement” in the clause below can be ignored, as
the Settlement Agreement referenced was never finalized, meaning that there is no distinguishing
between the two; every copy is a non-settlement copy. The Amended Agreement itself became
void when the Settlement Agreement was rejected, but the terms of the Amended Agreement
(Clause 34) indicated that should this come to pass, Google and UM would execute a separate
agreement to adopt certain terms, including that reproduced below. For that reason, the clause
still deserves some discussion.

Cooperative Web Services
16. Cooperative Web Services. Section 4.4.2, “Use of U of M
Digital Copy in Cooperative Web Services,” shall be replaced with
the following:
“4.4.2 Use of U of M Digital Copy in Cooperative Web Services.
Except as set forth in Section 4.4.3 and the terms of U of M’s
Library-Registry (Fully Participating) Agreement and this Section,
and provided U of M has obtained all necessary permissions,
rights, and licenses from third parties, U of M shall have the right
to use the U of M Digital Copy, in whole or in part at U of M’s
sole discretion, as part of web services offered in cooperation with
partner academic libraries and/or partner public research libraries
(such as the New York Public Library), including, without
limitation, the institutions in the Association of Research Libraries,
Digital Library Federation and similar organizations. Such services
may include, without limitation, indexes and finding tools, as well
as the reproduction and display of the U of M Digital Copy, to the
extent not otherwise prohibited by this Agreement and U of M’s
Library-Registry (Fully Participating) Agreement. Before U of M
makes any such use that involves the distribution of one or
more Digital Copies included within the U of M Digital Copy to
any such library, such library must enter into a written
agreement with Google, the form of which Google will provide

to U of M. Such agreement will (a) prohibit such receiving library
from redistributing such Digital Copies from the U of M Digital
Copy to any third party, except that U of M may authorize such
library to redistribute such Digital Copies as an agent and on
behalf of U of M subject to the rights and restrictions set forth in
this Agreement, provided U of M would have the right under this
Agreement to make such redistribution directly, (b) limit the
receiving library’s use of such Digital Copies from the U of M
Digital Copy to the sole purpose of providing cooperative web
services as set forth herein, which limitations on use shall in all
events be at least as restrictive as those placed on U of M’s use of
the U of M Digital Copy in this Agreement and, if applicable, the
Library-Registry (Fully Participating) Agreement, and (c) require
such receiving library (i) to use reasonable efforts to prevent third
parties from bulk downloading substantial portions of such Digital
Copies, and (ii) to implement technological measures (e.g., through
use of the robots.txt protocol) to restrict automated access to any
part of such entity’s website where substantial portions of such
Digital Copies are available. U of M will have the right to approve
those sections of the form of such agreement that grant any rights
that materially differ from the rights granted to U of M with
respect to the use of such portions of the U of M Digital Copy in
the Agreement.” (emphasis added)
The revised language is a marked improvement over the original. Under it, UM has much greater
freedom in determining how it wants to use its digital copies in cooperation with its partners.
However, later sentences and clauses belie that seeming liberation.
The language “U of M shall have the right to use the U of M Digital Copy, in whole or in
part at U of M’s sole discretion” makes it appear that UM really does have ownership, and that
Google has given up any stake in the copies. Jump a few sentences down, though, and the
restrictions on use reappear. The clause requires any library receiving a digital copy from UM to
enter into an agreement with Google, and the required terms of that agreement include a
prohibition on redistribution. As this new agreement is between the receiving library and Google,
the latter continues to hold the legal rights to enforce compliance.
Notably, there is still no cut-out in this clause for works that have fallen into the public
domain so the restrictions apply whether or not the copies are of works still protected by
copyright or works in the public domain.

Why the Public Interest Justifies Asking Congress to Intervene
The resulting Google Books database has been addressed by courts but only through the lens of
copyright (Authors Guild v. Google). What has not been discussed is how some of the benefits
that Google gained were far beyond what was necessary to the project, impinged on the public
good, and were (arguably) subsidized, at least in part, by public funds. In other words, might this
be a novel case of unjust enrichment23? This article considers whether or not it would be in the
interests of the nation to advocate for private legislation that nullifies the clauses that interfere
with the public good, allowing public investments to be maximized not just for Google’s private
enterprise but also for a public purpose.
The success of the Google Books project rested on making a copy of a corpus of content
that Google did not own and had no access to. But for the libraries that participated in the
project, Google would have not been able to obtain the content to be digitized, at least not
without financial and time investments far beyond what was used in digitization itself. Libraries
provided access to works spanning centuries, including rare titles unavailable even through
secondhand markets, and since these works had been selected by libraries, part of the
contribution came in the form of the collection development expertise to select the most
historically valuable works and exclude poorly constructed ones.
Some of these libraries, like the University of Michigan’s, are public, and even where the
majority of funding might now come from private sources (e.g., tuition), historically, their
collections were built in large measure through public funds. Their staff time and expertise at the
time of source selection falls under the same analysis, made possible only through public
investment. In some cases, more recent staff time and even on-site space was provided to Google
to facilitate processing, both of which would also be considered public resources.
Even private libraries receive public funds for their collections, whether indirectly
through tuition (and federal financial aid) or directly through grants.
There is significant public interest in allowing both public and private libraries to
determine how best to use the materials owned, as they are the ones with the societal obligations
to provide the public with reliable and long-term access to the content acquired. They would be
best placed to understand their communities’ needs and the mechanisms available to meet those
needs.
By using these libraries’ collections to build a database through which it can build
income generating activities (e.g., print on demand24), Google has leveraged public resources for
its private benefit. Further, this private benefit is an extended advantage, not encompassing only
access to and copies of the works that it digitized, but an artificial extension where it can control
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The reason this is an unusual claim is because unjust enrichment typically will not be recognized where a contract
exists. However, the argument in this case is that the parties to the contract were not the only interested parties, and
the unjust enrichment occurred at the cost of the public, which was not a party to the Google agreements.
24
For a description of its print on demand service, see Ryan Singel, Google Lets You Custom-Print Millions of
Public Domain Books, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/google-books-publish-on-demand/.

the distribution of content that it would not have had access to without the contributing libraries.
The owners of the original copies (libraries) are limited in what they can do with the digital
copies whereas they would not have been so constrained had they outsourced the digitization to
another third party.
Of course, the argument on the flip side is that Google provided free labor, and that
contracting parties are always welcome to bargain for terms that they think are fair. While that is
true, that what the University of Michigan (and other libraries agreed to) may have been what
they considered fair to their institutions, the question here is whether or not the contracts were
fair to the public, which subsidized the costs of the content and labor.
Google could also argue that it has provided the public with access to the materials
scanned, so enabling partner libraries to do the same is unnecessary. It has indeed provided a
public service, in the form of its searchable database, snippets, and associated tools (e.g., ngram), but that public service was achieved while simultaneously suppressing partner libraries’
ability to build on the content to build better engines, more equitable access, or public services.
Google’s services could have been accomplished without limiting the non-profit sector’s ability
to make full use of the images obtained.
As Google now arguably has reaped much of the benefits of the bargain, obtaining
content of books without ever paying for them, being the first entity to create a searchable
database of books, and having experimented with business models based on the content, it is now
time to consider whether the agreements damage the public good beyond the private interests of
letting the contract terms stand. To allow each party to retain some benefit of the bargain, most
of the terms could remain undisturbed, with only those clauses contradicting the principles of
alienation neutralized. The mechanism through which such an agreement might be amended
without the parties’ consent is through private legislation.
Private Laws
Private laws are simply pieces of legislation that are intended to apply only to the parties named
in that legislation.25 This is contrasted with public laws that have general applicability. Private
laws are not frequently enacted, and over the last decade there have been fewer than a handful
each year, but when this vehicle has been used, the subject matter is fairly varied.
Private legislation can be as simple and uncontroversial as authorizing a national award
(e.g., bestowing Medal of Honor26), or can be the end result of months’- or years’- long efforts.
Examples in this latter category include granting specific relief to individuals or groups (e.g.,
authorizing special immigration treatment27), disbursing of funds to a group facing unusual
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injuries,28 empowering a court to resolve specific disputes (e.g., delegating to the Court of
Claims),29 or remedying a particular government harm to an identified party.30 Its use has been
likened to an equitable action at law, where action is taken when a legal authority’s conscience is
pricked, as opposed to correcting an actual violation of an enacted law or regulation.31
There is no strict definition of federal private laws, though one 1966 article remarked on
its seemingly self-imposed limits:
…private legislation presently deals only with relationships
between individuals and the Government. Specifically, only two
categories of private bills are passed: (1) those dealing with claims
against the United States, including waiver of claims by the
Government against individuals; and (2) those excepting
individuals from certain immigration and naturalization
requirements. Bills dealing with relations between private persons,
formerly enacted on occasion, are no longer passed.32
…and pointed out that there had to be some commonsense limits to what actions were permitted
through this vehicle. The article concluded that a private law must still fall within the enumerated
powers of Congress; otherwise, individuals and groups could circumvent state, court, and
executive authority through private legislation.33
Given that contracts fall squarely within the province of the states, even if Congress
determined that the Google-Library Partner contracts caused public harm, would they have the
power to act?
Possible Constitutional Bases
Despite the division between federal and state authority, the Google Books project contains some
unique features that could justify federal intervention in what would normally be a state matter.
All of those features implicate Congress’ powers to regulate interstate commerce.
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First, the contract terms dictate what Library Partners can and cannot do with the digital
copies online. The terms interfere with commerce both directly and indirectly, directly through
the clauses that prohibit sharing with anyone engaging in the same business as Google and
indirectly through the clauses that limit sharing with all others.
Second, antitrust issues are raised through the same limiting clauses. Given the specific
wording of the clauses, in particular, the prohibition against sharing digital copies with entities
“providing search or hosting services substantially similar to those provided by Google,” the
monopolistic intent is clear. The clause has no purpose other than to preserve Google’s
monopoly. Of course, monopolies by themselves are not necessarily illegal; after all, copyright’s
very nature is monopolistic.
But, Google’s monopoly was gained using public resources, which should give rise to a
greater state and federal right to scrutinize the monopoly and the resources being used to further
the monopoly. There is no purpose to restricting a library’s use of content that it has acquired
except to prevent it from “competing” with Google. Since the library would have to comply with
copyright in any case, its subsequent use of those digital objects would still be subject to
copyright, so any interest served by copyright survives regardless of contract terms and should
be irrelevant to its agreement with Google.
Another antitrust-like argument is one that claims federal jurisdiction under a
permutation of the essential facilities doctrine. This doctrine historically has four requirements:
(1) control of the essential facility (resource) by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the facility;
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
(4) the feasibility of providing competitive access to the facility.34
…and when these elements are met, the government may intercede to break an otherwise
legitimate monopoly. The doctrine has most often been used where an entity has a legal
monopoly in one aspect of business and uses its control to extend the monopoly into an adjacent
market.35
The argument in this case is that the digital images are an essential facility, in the form of
an information conduit, and that (a) the contracts that Google has with its partners establish its
control over that facility, (b) it is practically impossible to duplicate the scanning that Google did
(or rather, that it is a complete waste of public funds to duplicate this effort when the images
exist and were created from content purchased through public funds), (c) the clauses deny full
use rights to the Participating Libraries as well as limit the sharing of these images to others
including potential competitors, and (d) Google does not need to invest addition time, effort, or
money to lift the restrictions.
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Even in its standard formulation, the use of this doctrine is controversial, rare, and also
usually goes through the courts. The reason that private legislation is suggested in this instance
instead is because the intent is not to open up the use of Google’s database to all comers but
rather just to end its right to stop its Library Partners from using digital copies of resources it
already owns. The doctrine is raised only to establish a possible parallel for a basis for the right
of the federal government, in the form of Congress, to intervene.
Third, falling under citizens’ privacy writ large --- which is not the right to privacy
within the Constitution, which only protects against state intrusions on privacy --- the contract
provisions have the purpose of protecting a monopoly in a manner that violates the privacy of the
nation’s citizens. It is already well known that Google collects information on the users of all of
its tools, a cost to the public to which users are generally not asked to consent. By prohibiting
libraries from utilizing the images, Google is using its monopolistic control over the digital
images to gather personal information on users, both (1) creating yet another data store with
commercial implications and (2) preventing libraries from creating privacy-protecting
alternatives to Google’s databases.
Other Objections to Private Laws
In the past, private laws have come under the greatest criticism for being inequitable, granting a
specific benefit or relief only to a single person or a small group of people. Everyone else
similarly situated will not get the benefit of the legislation.36 However, in the case of
information, it is possible that a private law could actually increase equity, not in how the party
or similar parties are treated, but simply by enabling wider, fairer access to information.
The other common objection to private laws, and what led to a significant decline in use,
was evidence of corruption in the legislative process.37 In the 1960s and 70s, there were
numerous allegations of bias or inappropriate behavior. Lawmakers or their aides were accused
of taking bribes or soliciting bribes to introduce private legislation. It would be difficult to see
how the legislation being proposed in this paper would be subject to bias, as it is obviously for
the public benefit, via libraries, not for any individual, corporate, or for-profit interest. The
Partner Libraries obviously would benefit over all others, but since their missions are to serve
broad communities, the benefit would not be fully contained even if they chose to take no further
action.
Post-Enactment Actions By Library Partners
To see the full impact of this type of private legislation, two actions by the libraries owning the
images would be necessary. First, because private laws are rarely undertaken without a request
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from one of the parties involved,38 the libraries would have to be willing to bring the matter to
Congress’ attention39. The second necessary step would come after any private law was enacted,
as the effect of the law would not be felt by the public unless the libraries owning these images
share them with others beyond what they have been doing through HathiTrust.
In the following sections, while possibilities with this second step are explored, the
original Google-Partner-Library will be referred to as the OL (Owning Library), and any library
receiving the copies of the images will be referenced as RL (Receiving Library).

Expanded Access
If private legislation is passed, the simplest and most obvious step for an OL library to take is to
expand public access to its works. This could be as basic as duplicating some of the services that
Google offers, allowing the public to search the full texts of its databases and presenting search
results in the form of snippets or limited full pages instead of just hit counts. Or, an OL library
could take more expansive steps, allowing Wikipedia or other reference sources (e.g.,
newspapers) to link to the works, much as the Internet Archive does, even if it does not allow
any more than viewing the page referenced. Such linking could even be made available to the
public, through direct linking, a link creation tool like those provided by databases40 or
authentication portals (e.g., OpenAthens),41 or by establishing consistent and publicized URL
schemas such that on-the-fly, dynamic linking is possible. But none of these actions in isolation
have the impact of an aggregated national collection, a step that might be possible through other
means.
Controlled Digital Lending
CDL is a library effort to ensure that legitimately acquired library materials remain useable
despite changes in technology, which come much more rapidly now than ever before, or user
preferences in formats. Presently, the initiatives focus on digitizing material and lending these eversions in place of the original physical items, but the same general principles could apply to
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other technologies. The detailed fair use analysis of CDL is well documented elsewhere42 so will
not be rehashed here.
While CDL implementations may vary in specifics, all share common characteristics:
Properly implemented, CDL enables a library to circulate a
digitized title in place of a physical one in a controlled manner.
Under this approach, a library may only loan simultaneously the
number of copies that it has legitimately acquired, usually through
purchase or donation. For example, if a library owns three copies
of a title and digitizes one copy, it may use CDL to circulate one
digital copy and two print, or three digital copies, or two digital
copies and one print; in all cases, it could only circulate the same
number of copies that it owned before digitization. Essentially,
CDL must maintain an “owned to loaned” ratio. Circulation in any
format is controlled so that only one user can use any given copy at
a time, for a limited time. Further, CDL systems generally employ
appropriate technical measures to prevent users from retaining a
permanent copy or distributing additional copies.43
Each of CDL’s three requirements deserve further elaboration. The first requirement is that any
library engaging in CDL must have legitimately acquired the physical works to be digitized,
typically through gift or purchase. This means that the copyright owner received remuneration
for her work at the time the physical work was first purchased, and that the entity copying and
lending the work is an owner of a legitimately acquired copy.
Second, a CDL provider conforms to an own-to-loan ratio, lending out only the number
of copies legitimately acquired. The number of copies a library can circulate remains the same
both pre- and post-format shifting. Therefore, under CDL, a library cannot digitize a work to
increase the number of copies used over the number owned.
Last, all adopt digital rights management (DRM) tools to control use, so that a digital
version of a book cannot be copied wholesale, redistributed by the user, or accessed by more
users than permitted by the number of copies the library owns. Some of the tools used in current
initiatives are the same ones used by the publishing industry for their e-books – Overdrive and
Adobe Digital Editions – so the protections are the same as established standards. Since the
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pandemic, libraries have begun exploring other platforms, but all so far contain similar DRM
restrictions.
It is important to note that CDL is not a proposal for anyone to be able to format shift and
lend; it is only intended for libraries, and this element has been a core aspect of the framework.
This narrow configuration makes sense in context, as libraries have a unique standing in society
and in copyright law44. The vast majority of libraries are non-profit, non-commercial entities
charged with serving the public interest, though corporate libraries may be an exception. This
article looks at the majority only, with public and academic libraries as the models.
Private legislation could facilitate the public reach of CDL in three ways. The first would
take shape if one or more of the OLs elects to share its collection with the general public, still
complying with the principles of CDL but allowing anyone, including those in smaller and
poorer communities, to access works their libraries do not hold and they would otherwise be
unable to read. To understand the scope of the potential impact, approximately 77% of all public
libraries in the nation are small or rural libraries,45 and in 2019, over 50% of all public libraries
had an annual collection budget of under $34,00046. When considering budget, the cost of books,
and inflation rates, these libraries simply have fewer means to obtain content than better funded
libraries. Better funded libraries in larger communities may be reluctant to share all works,
particularly those in high demand, but CDL platforms can be deployed to share broadly only
portions of a collection, allowing broader use of lesser-used materials while preserving highdemand materials only for local use.
The second path for expansion goes to the unwritten requirement of any CDL program --that there be a digital equivalent available to be used in place of the owned physical title. In
many cases, this is accomplished through some sort of format shifting. A library would convert
the content in the physical article acquired into a different format, in this case, an electronic
format through digitization, with the intention of using the new format in place of the old. In
instances where a library may own more than one copy, it may choose to use the new format in
place of only a percentage of the owned copies, using some in their original formats and others in
their converted ones. Though the digitized works are likely to be processed for optical character
recognition, for searching and screen reader functionality, the content of the work remains the
same as the original. The library makes no edits or changes to the work itself.
If the Google contract terms limiting sharing are nullified, and if OLs are willing to share
their images broadly with other libraries already owning physical copies of the same works, they
would reduce the workload on the nation’s libraries, as none of those libraries would need to
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digitize these titles themselves. They would simultaneously free up these libraries’ time to
digitize titles not yet converted to digital form, which they, in turn, could then share with other
libraries. In this manner, the nation’s libraries’ physical collections can all be methodically
digitized, maximizing the efforts of every library to advantage society at large. In terms of
immediate effect, this sharing would also expand exponentially the number of digital copies
available for circulation at any given time, across different communities. A single instance of
digitization could provide the e-book equivalents to thousands of libraries that already own a
print copy. It would similarly allow more libraries to make their works available for lending to
other communities (via ILL or otherwise), or linking to sources like Wikipedia or newspapers so
that verification is streamlined.
The last and most publicly beneficial outcome of private legislation would be a merger of
the concepts in the first and second paths. If every library obtaining copies of images from an OL
were willing to share their resulting e-copies with the public through CDL and though a unified
interface,47 a significant portion of the information divide caused by poverty would be addressed.
In many cases, multiple copies of the same title would be available to the public for checkout,
regardless of location or wealth, easily found and accessed. For Wikipedia, news sites, and social
media users, there would be no need to scour multiple sites or libraries for a source for
verification; a single entry point would provide pointers to all sources available for those
interested in supporting their statements with fact.
Fair Use Analysis for the Sharing of Library Images
Past scholarship has already made the argument that the sharing of digitized images with other
libraries for CDL purposes falls under fair use.48 As a reminder, fair use is currently codified in
§107:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
This test is the one most often applied when a copyright owner’s exclusive rights are exercised
without authorization or remuneration and a public interest is invoked. The primary principle
behind fair use is the belief that the public benefit in some uses can justify the abridgement of
author’s rights to control their work or to obtain payment for the use of their work.49 The four
factors listed must be addressed by any court faced with a fair use claim, but jurists are not
limited to examining only these issues when they conduct their analysis. In practice, scholars
have shown that the second and third factors of the legal analysis have been subsumed by the
first and fourth factors,50 so the only two factors that will be discussed in the following three
subsections are the two that remain relevant.
Despite the fair use claims for the sharing of digitized books, the reality is that CDL has
not yet been tested by the courts, and general counsel offices are directed to focus on risk. Even
officers that believe CDL is legal might view this type of sharing as unnecessarily increasing
risk beyond basic CDL, especially as they cannot guarantee that a receiving library would use the
images only for CDL. Therefore, this section looks at additional steps that an OL might take to
ease the minds of their legal advisors.
Receiving Library’s Written Assumption of Responsibility
The OL could (1) limit any sharing to other non-profit libraries only and (2) require the recipient
to certify that they own a copy of the work(s) for which they’re requesting digital images and
that the digital copies will be used only for CDL. Ownership of these copies would permanently
49
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transferred to the RL. This should clearly limit any OL liability to the sharing of the image itself
and not to any subsequent actions by the recipient library, and any sharing would fall squarely
within fair use in an analysis similar to that applied to CDL. The analysis in brief:
The purpose and character of use, the first factor, most often weighs against fair use in
two instances: where the use is commercial,51 or where it is used “to supersede the use of the
original work”52 without compensating the copyright owner. The second of these appears to be
less important, as there have been many uses that have been determined to be fair even where the
use supersedes the use of the original. In all cases, the uses have been non-commercial.
Examples include the Betamax and its recording of shows that made it unnecessary to watch the
original,53 the use of Google’s thumbnail images instead of the full-sized originals,54 and the
provision of digitized full-text copies of books to the print disabled.55
In the sharing scenario described in this subsection, the use would be non-commercial, as
the OL would be providing the images to the RL without any compensation or benefit and for the
purpose of replacing the RL’s physical copy with this digital copy in compliance with the
principles of CDL. As with CDL generally, the digital copies would be used in place of physical
copies and therefore serve the same purpose as the physical copy did – to get acquired content to
users. The use does substitute for using the original, but unlike most fair use cases, the original in
this instance is a copy that the library already purchased and owned. Because the use falls within
a core library purpose (lending), simply changes the form of the object and not the purpose or
content of use, and no more copies are used than owned, this factor should favor fair use.
Looking now to the fourth factor, the impact on the market or potential market for the
work, no harm should be found. The work is being shared for the stated purpose of CDL, where
both libraries have already paid the copyright owner(s) for the works and no more copies are
used than purchased. The digital copy being shared merely takes the place of the RL’s physical
copy and therefore does not displace any unsold copy on the market. The number of copies in
use, even across all libraries sharing these images, will not be increased. As the number of copies
in use are no more than the number of copies authorized by the author (even if they are being
used in different formats), there is no market harm. The number of copies that would have been
sold to libraries have been sold to libraries; all libraries have done is to determine that a different
form, not a changed number of copies, is needed. As with the first factor, the fourth factor should
also favor fair use.
Notice of Copyright and Limitation of Liability
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Alternatively, to avoid the type of recordkeeping necessary with written agreements, the OL
could take an approach guided by long-standing ILL practices, simply embedding a copyright
notice on the scans. That notice would state that the images are being provided to a non-profit
library for use by that library for legitimate library uses. Ownership of the copies again transfers
to the RL upon receipt, and the RL is responsible for any subsequent uses. ILL practices, of
course, are notably different, justified by §108 and intended for the private use of an end-user. If
the OL is sharing the images with another library outside of the purposes of §108, then that
action would need to be justified under one of the other exceptions, fair use.
While the analysis is not as straightforward as in the first option above, sharing under this
scenario should also be seen as fair. The purpose and character of use would again be noncommercial, as the OL would be providing it to the RL without any compensation or benefit and
for the purpose of enabling the RL’s library legitimate uses of the images. That the OL does not
dictate what is legitimate should not injure its standing under this factor unless (1) the RL was
intending to use the images illegally and (2) the OL library was aware of this intent before
sharing. The OL has made and distributed a copy to another library, but fair use caselaw provides
a long list of instances where reproduction and distribution by themselves have been deemed
fair.56 The circumstances here, where the OL knows that the RL already has a physical copy in
its collection and where the OL has no knowledge of an intent to infringe copyright, would seem
to support a fair use claim as well.
The more problematic analysis here falls to the fourth factor, as there is no longer any
promise or statement by the RL library that it will be using the images only for a specific
function – CDL – or even that the RL library owns a physical copy of the work. However, if the
OL only provides these digitized images to libraries that own a physical copy, it again could
argue that the provision of the copy by itself has no market effect. By sharing, the OL library did
not increase the number of the copies on the market. It provided a digital copy to another library
that already had purchased a copy, but that copy has no practical effect on any market unless it is
used. Because the embedded copyright notice clearly states that the RL library assumes
responsibility for subsequent uses, if the RL library then uses the work inappropriately, its
actions may fall under infringement, but the OL would have had no role in the decisions
regarding use of the images. In this configuration of sharing, the fourth factor should also lean
towards fair use.
The analysis may change if the RL library does not own a copy of the work independent
of the digital copy. While sharing may still be permitted under §108 for ILL or preservation
purposes, those reasons and uses are narrow. The conditions under which an OL might share a
work with an RL outside of §108 are so varied that it is impossible to apply a fair use analysis to
all without specific contexts.
Overall, even though the argument for fair use in this subsection may fall into a greyer
area than the first subsection, there are societal reasons why both the OL and RL might prefer
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this version. It not only (1) eliminates the need to duplicate effort in digitizing, OCR-ing, and
adding metadata and (2) shifts liability, but it also allows the RL library to undertake more
innovative uses with the work, if it is more open to risk than the OL. For example, the RL might
revive a speech-to-text practice attempted by Amazon in 2009 with its Kindle 2,57 including for
downloaded books. Or, it could enable selected copying and pasting (e.g., up to a paragraph), to
make it easier for users to create citations, much like the limited copying and pasting available in
some databases like Lexis and Westlaw, which allow the user to copy not only a specific amount
of text, but also the citation of the work. Each of these actions comes under a separate fair use
analysis so could be viewed as adding risk, but both also serve legitimate research and public
interest functions (e.g., assisting those with disabilities) that an RL may want to further.
Self-Service Repository

A third option would be the most ambitious and expensive but would carry secondary benefits
even greater than those explored in the first two subsections. That option would be depositing all
of the images into a central repository for all non-profit libraries to use. The repository preferably
would be managed by a government organization with the same preservation and access interests
as libraries (e.g., Library of Congress or the National Archives), as this would place the cost of
maintaining a public good with the government and would ensure the preservation of the images
regardless of the existence of any other institution, but it could be established independently as
well.
As with the second option, there are too many permutations on how such a repository
could be structured, so a full fair use analysis is impossible without specifics. However, one
configuration will be outlined for the purposes of illustration.
Imagine a repository where every OL deposits its images, and where any non-profit
library could obtain an authenticated account (or another restricted, verified path such as a static
IP) to download images. To establish an account, a library would first have to certify that it is a
non-profit library; accept all responsibility for activity on the account and subsequent use of
images; guarantee that it will take appropriate security measures with the account (e.g.,
password management in accordance with best practices); pledge that it will not download any
images of works where it does not already own a copy of the work; acknowledge that the images
of works not in the public domain are protected by copyright and that the library bears
responsibility for complying with copyright in their use. The account user, then, would be able to
search and download images without mediation. The repository could take extra precautions by
requiring each library downloading a work’s digital copies to enter its library system’s record of
the owned copy (e.g., order or item record number) before each download.
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Sharing under this scenario should also be seen as fair. The purpose and character of use
would again be non-commercial, as the OL would be providing it to the repository without any
compensation or financial benefit and for the purpose of (1) preserving the images, and (2)
enabling other libraries’ legitimate uses of the images. Because the conditions under which
libraries can use the images are limited by their agreement with the repository, the OL has no
reason to believe that the images will be used for anything other than legitimate purposes. The
OL has made and deposited a copy to the repository, but as noted in the subsection above,
caselaw has established that the storage of copies, even multiple copies, can be fair. The first
factor, then, should favor fair use.
Under the fourth factor, the provision of the copy should have no market effect. By
sharing, the OL library did not increase the number of the copies on the market. It provided a
digital copy to a repository for preservation and use by other libraries with owned copies. As in
the other two subsections, the copy uploaded to the repository has no practical effect on any
market unless it is used. As the conditions for library use (1) limit the use of downloads only to
images where the library owns a copy of the work and (2) clearly place responsibility for
copyright compliance the RL, the OL library’s deposit with the repository should not be
confused with subsequent use. In this configuration of sharing, then, the fourth factor should
also lean towards fair use.
Of course, a complication is triggered if the OL is also the repository, in which case, the
most relevant cases may seem to be the litigation surrounding early file sharing platforms (e.g.,
Napster, Grokster)58 where each of the uses were found to be unfair. In those cases, file sharing
platforms allowed users to anonymously upload or download music where the music may never
have been owned by either the uploaded or downloaded. Some openly advertised their platforms
as mechanisms to get free music and failed to take action even though they were well aware of
infringing uses.59 All of those cases can be distinguished easily from libraries sharing images of
copyrighted works with other libraries that already own copies of those works.
On the first factor, each of the file sharing platforms engaged in commercial activity,
whether charging for advertising60 or through “repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies.”61 Though
the platforms did advance some arguably legitimate purposes, such as owners of CDs using the
platforms to download the digital versions of those CDs in space-shifting, the court rejected the
claim because the platforms did not provide these versions only to owners but also to the general
public.62 In this subsection’s proposal, a repository would not be engaging in commercial
activity, its use is not to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies (as all libraries using
58

A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Apr. 3, 2001), aff'd sub nom. A&M
Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002), and aff'd sub nom. A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284
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the works would have had to have legitimately obtained copies), and the repository would not
make the images available to the public but would only provide access to verified libraries for
specific uses.
On the fourth factor, in the case of file sharing, the litigants presented dueling reports on
whether or not the platforms harmed or benefitted the works and while the courts struggled with
determining the veracity of any report, what doomed the platforms was largely the fact that the
commerciality of their activities allowed the courts to presume harm.63 As a repository’s actions
relating to the sharing of library digital images would be non-commercial, that presumption is
not only lifted but works in the other direction. Based on Sony, the presumption should be that
there is no harm, and copyright owners would need to provide evidence of harm or the likelihood
of harm. Because of the design of the agreement between the repository and downloading
libraries, that harm would be difficult to prove. Each library would have already purchased a
copy of the work; so long as they use that work in line with CDL principles, the number of
copies used nationwide would be no different pre- or post-download. The same number of copies
used would be the same number purchased.
For many reasons, this option would provide the greatest overall benefit for society. Not
only does it capture the flexibility in innovation as noted in the second option, but it (1) provides
a searchable repository that can also be used as a read-only centralized catalog of all works
digitized so that libraries would know what has already been digitized before undertaking the
time and expense to digitize a new title; (2) encourages purchasing books insofar as libraries that
want to use the digital images must own a copy, and those that do not already own the works
may therefore be prompted to search out physical copies; (3) establishes a central clearinghouse
where images can be uploaded as well as downloaded, enabling all libraries to collaborate on
digitizing the world’s published works more effectively.

Conclusion
Unfiltered, unverified information flows freely on the web and is much more easily found and
used than reliable sources. There are logical reasons for this, as quality, reliable information
often costs both time and money to investigate, verify, and publish. However, that type of
investment only justifies the charging for the information at the outset, not the cabining of it once
it is available and has been purchased. Where public libraries have acquired content, they should
be allowed to maximize its use in society within the bounds of copyright. Such use is within the
spirit of copyright and its hope for an informed citizenry and more equal access to information.
Private legislation coupled with library collaboration on multiplying access points could make
quality information available to the public in a quantity and manner that could help fight the war
on misinformation.
Id. at 1017, citing Sony (“If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of market harm] may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
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